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A neuroscience-based approach has recently been proposed for the relation between
the mind and the brain. The proposal is that events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and
neuronal network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be
described at a high level as a mental state, with content about the world. It is argued that
as the processes at the different levels of explanation take place at the same time, they
are linked by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality can best be described in
brains as operating within but not between levels. This mind-brain theory allows mental
events to be different in kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does
not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or vice versa: they are
different levels of explanation of the operation of the computational system. Here, some
implications are developed. It is proposed that causality, at least as it applies to the
brain, should satisfy three conditions. First, interventionist tests for causality must be
satisfied. Second, the causally related events should be at the same level of explanation.
Third, a temporal order condition must be satisfied, with a suitable time scale in the
order of 10 ms (to exclude application to quantum physics; and a cause cannot follow
an effect). Next, although it may be useful for different purposes to describe causality
involving the mind and brain at the mental level, or at the brain level, it is argued that
the brain level may sometimes be more accurate, for sometimes causal accounts at
the mental level may arise from confabulation by the mentalee, whereas understanding
exactly what computations have occurred in the brain that result in a choice or action
will provide the correct causal account for why a choice or action was made. Next,
it is argued that possible cases of “downward causation” can be accounted for by
a within-levels-of-explanation account of causality. This computational neuroscience
approach provides an opportunity to proceed beyond Cartesian dualism and physical
reductionism in considering the relations between the mind and the brain.
Keywords: the mind-brain problem, causality, neuronal networks, neural computation, consciousness,
computational neuroscience, dualism, supervenience
INTRODUCTION
A neuroscience-based approach has recently been proposed for the relation between the mind and
the brain (Rolls, 2021a). The proposal is that events at the sub-neuronal, neuronal, and neuronal
network levels take place simultaneously to perform a computation that can be described at a high
level as a mental state, with content about the world. It is argued that as the processes at the different
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levels of explanation take place at the same time, they are linked
by a non-causal supervenient relationship: causality can best be
described in brains as operating within but not between levels.
This mind-brain theory allows mental events to be different in
kind from the mechanistic events that underlie them; but does
not lead one to argue that mental events cause brain events, or
vice versa: they are different levels of explanation of the operation
of the computational system. This approach may provide a
way of thinking about brains and minds that is different from
dualism and from reductive physicalism (Kim, 2011), and which
is rooted in the computational processes that are fundamental to
understanding brain and mental events, and that mean that the
mental and mechanistic levels are linked by the computational
process being performed. Explanations at the different levels of
operation may be useful in different ways (cf Dennett, 1991). For
example, if we wish to understand how arithmetic is performed
in the brain, description at the mental level of the algorithm
being computed will be useful. But if the brain operates to result
in mental disorders, then understanding the mechanism at the
neural processing level may be more useful, in for example the
treatment of psychiatric disorders.
In terms of levels of explanation that apply to the brain and
mental operations, a number of different levels of explanation
can be identified (Rolls, 2021a). They include ion channels
in neurons influenced by neurotransmitters released at the
tens of thousands of synapses on each neuron through which
currents pass to influence the firing rate of individual neurons;
neuronal biophysics that influences how these currents are
converted into firing rates; the firing rates of individual neurons;
the computations performed by populations of neurons often
involving collective computations as in attractor networks and
competitive networks; how the activity of populations of neurons
is reflected by functional neuroimaging; to behavioral and
cognitive effects, including mental operations, verbal reports, and
phenomenal consciousness (Rolls, 2016, 2020, 2021c,a). I regard
these as different levels of explanation of the operation of a
computational system such as the brain.
Some key points are developed further here. One is what the
implications are for theories of causality. A second key point is
which level of explanation may provide a more accurate account
for the cause of a choice or action: the mental level, or the
computational neuroscience level. A third key point is whether
there are any cases in which it might be appropriate to provide
a “downward causation” account, in which a higher level of the
system causes effects at a lower level.
CAUSALITY
Intervention
The most widely considered approach to causality is an
interventionist account (Woodward, 2005, 2015, 2020, 2021b;
Craver and Bechtel, 2007; Kim, 2011). If one intervenes to remove
a potential cause, and the putative effect no longer occurs, then
that makes it more likely that the potential cause does cause
the putative effect. [More formally, where X and Y are variables,
X causes Y if there are some possible interventions that would
change the value of X and if such intervention were to occur, a
regular change in the value of Y would occur (Woodward, 2020,
2021b)]. So this is a necessary condition for causality. But I now
argue that it is not a sufficient condition, at least in relation to
mental and brain events.
Causality Operates Within a Level of
Operation and Explanation, Not Between
Levels
The argument follows from my approach to causality in minds
and brains, that causality can best be considered as operating
within a level of explanation, and not between levels. So
a second condition I argue that needs to be satisfied for
causality is that the cause and effect are within the same
level of explanation. I made it relatively clear in my earlier
exposition (Rolls, 2021a) that level here might refer to the
mental level, for example a cause provided verbally by an
individual for an action; or it might be at a computational
level for what might be computed by a population of neurons;
or it might be at the single neuron level; or it might be
at the level of transmitters influencing ion channels to make
neurons fire more or less, etc. (Rolls, 2021a). The bases for
this argument, that causality operates within but not between
the levels of operation and explanation of the system are
set out for both minds / brains and for computers by Rolls
(2021a). The bases include the point that the processes that
occur at the different levels can occur simultaneously (for
example the mental and brain event, or the mathematical or
logic operation performed by a computer and the current flow
within its arithmetic logic unit), whereas causal processes can
be understood to involve sequences of events in time with the
operations performed within a level.
This point is important. If all I held was an interventionist
account of causality, then I might find the conditions satisfied that
a mental event might cause a brain event, and it would be difficult
to exclude that in terms of possible interventions. But that would
be incorrect, if one holds that causality should best be considered
to operate within a level of explanation, and not between levels of
explanation, as set out elsewhere (Rolls, 2021a).
In brief, an interventionist account might not be able to
reject the hypothesis that mental events cause brain events,
for particular mental events will always and indissolubly be
associated with brain events. The reason for this is that an
interventionist account of causality might diagnose cases of
causality that act across levels of explanation. The implication
is that the interventionist account alone will not suffice as a
criterion for causality, at least for operations in brains and
computers. The criteria would have to include also a restriction
to events at the same level of explanation.
Temporal Order
Temporal order may also be useful as a condition for whether
causality applies. At its simplest, a cause cannot follow an
effect, as least in the macro world that is considered here. In
neuroscience (and this may be different from quantum physics),
we think that when causes produce effects a time delay is a
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useful indicator. Following this thinking, when one step of a
process at one level of explanation moves to the next step in
time, we can speak of causality that would meet the criteria for
Granger causality where one time series, including the time series
being considered, can be used to predict what happens at the
next step in time (Granger, 1969; Bressler and Seth, 2011; Ge
et al., 2012). In relation to neuroscience, the timing of a set of
events measured with an accuracy of in the order of 10 ms and
for a sufficient period on either side of the causal event being
tested would suffice. This time scale, with very many time-steps
of 10 ms on each side of the putative cause-effect relationship
should be adequate, in that the time-scale of computation in
the brain is in the order of 10–15 ms, which is the time that it
might take a pattern association network, a competitive network,
or even an attractor network to perform its computation (Rolls,
2021c) (see below).
The implication of temporal order for levels of explanation
and causality is that when we consider the relationship between
processes described at different levels of explanation, such as the
relation between a step in the hardware in a computer and a step
in the software, then these processes may occur simultaneously,
and be inextricably linked with each other, and just be different
ways of describing the same process, so that temporal (Granger)
causality does not apply to this relation between levels, but only
within levels. The whole processing can then be specified from
the mechanistic level of neuronal firings, etc., up through the
computational level to the cognitive and behavioral level, as
described elsewhere (Rolls, 2021a,c). The thrust of this argument
is that temporal order is also a useful criterion to identify
causality, at least at the macro level of events in the mind and
the brain; and in computers.
Criteria for Causality
These points lead to my proposal for conditions that need to be
tested for and satisfied to assess whether causality applies in a
particular case, as follows:
1. Interventionist tests need to be satisfied. Interventionist
tests provide conditions that need to be satisfied for
causality, but they are not sufficient conditions for causality
to be identified.
2. The events should be at the same level of explanation.
Further details are described elsewhere (Rolls, 2021a).
3. Temporal order needs to be satisfied, as set out above.
Details about how this applies in the brain are provided
elsewhere (Rolls, 2021a).
Criterion (1), interventionism, follows Woodward (2005,
2015), and is what I would describe as a way of testing whether
causality can be excluded in a particular case, rather than a
substantive account of causality.
Criterion (2), that causality operates within but not between
levels of explanation, moves beyond a purely interventionist
account of causality, and is a proposal that I made, and elaborated
in considering how causality operates within a multilevel system
such as the mind and brain, and the software and hardware of a
computer (Rolls, 2021a).
Criterion (3), temporal order, also goes beyond a purely
interventionist account, and is helpful partly because
it helps to diagnose that processes at different levels of
operation and explanation of at least a computational system
may be occurring at the same time, and therefore should
not be diagnosed as influencing each other causally. The
relation between what is happening at the different levels of
explanation is instead described as supervenient (or subvenient)
(Rolls, 2021a).
Part of the aim of this paper is to make these proposed criteria
for causality very explicit, in order to promote discussion of this
approach to causality, as it may offer a useful way forward in
helping to understand the relation between mental events and
brain events, and for that matter between software events and
hardware events in computers.
My answer to the first key aim of this paper is that the theory
of causality should be extended to include the three criteria listed
above, and to go beyond purely interventionist approaches to
diagnosing causality, at least for systems such as the brain and
the mind, and for conventional digital computers.
WHICH LEVEL OF EXPLANATION MAY
PROVIDE A MORE ACCURATE
ACCOUNT FOR THE CAUSE OF A
CHOICE OR ACTION: THE MENTAL
LEVEL, OR THE COMPUTATIONAL
NEUROSCIENCE LEVEL?
An appropriate level of description for the causes of events can be
chosen in a levels of explanation account of the relation between
the mind and the brain (Rolls, 2021a). Sometimes it may be the
mental level, for example when we are explaining how we may
have made progress with a problem such as the relation between
the mind and the brain; and sometimes it may be the brain
level, for example when we are considering which drug may be
appropriate to treat a particular mental disorder.
However, it is interesting to consider at which level of
explanation causality may be most accurate. It is well-known for
example that confabulation can occur, and the rational mind may
fabricate an account for why a choice was made or an action was
performed. Part of the reason for confabulation by the rational
system may be to help it maintain a long-term autobiographical
narrative about the person’s self, and the need for the rational
system to believe that it is in control, for otherwise it might stop
trying (Rolls, 2012b).
An example of confabulation is found in split brain humans
who may say they prefer one house because it has some
extras, or that there is no particular reason for their choice,
when in fact they have been shown a picture to their non-
dominant hemisphere that the other house is on fire (Gazzaniga
and LeDoux, 1978; Gazzaniga et al., 2019). Confabulation may
happen frequently when the emotional brain contributes an
input to a decision, and the rational brain confabulates an
explanation for why the choice was made, because there are
multiple routes to action (Rolls, 2014; Figure 1). In such
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cases, we can know about the real cause of the decision or
action only by knowing which brain systems were involved in
taking the decision, and how the computation was performed
that led to the decision, rather than by relying on any verbal
explanation from the rational system that may be provided
for the decision, for that might be a confabulation. For
emotion-related decisions, it is suggested that confabulation by
the rational system may occur frequently (Rolls, 2014). But
when the decisions are taken by the rational system, it is
more likely to be able to provide a correct causal account of
the steps in the decision-making process, because the report
comes from the same neural system involved in the reasoning
(Rolls, 2020).
In patients with brain damage, confabulation is of course
well known. It is common in patients with memory problems
due to damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Schneider
and Koenigs, 2017), or to the hippocampal memory system in
for example Korsakoff’s psychosis associated with alcoholism
(Dalla Barba and Kopelman, 2017). Although there are a number
of different possible factors that account for confabulation
in patients with brain damage (Dalla Barba and Kopelman,
2017), part of the problem may be a weaker signal in the
memory system than is usual, so that the patient has to make
up a rational explanation (in the form of a confabulation)
in order to maintain a consistent model of the self (Rolls,
2020). This account may also fit why confabulation can occur
in healthy people when the emotional decision-making system
in the brain makes a decision, because the rational system
has only imperfect access to the emotional decision system
when the rational system is called on to provide reports. My
hypothesis is that whether the emotional or the rational decision-
making system actually takes a decision on a particular trial is
itself a noisy decision-making process (Rolls and Deco, 2010;
Rolls, 2011, 2016, 2020).
The overall implication of this consideration of “multiple
routes to action” is that some levels of explanation may
provide more accurate evidence about the causes of decisions
and actions than others. The best way to understand the
operation of a system may not necessarily be at the level at
which a simple account can be provided and even verbally
reported, in our example at the mental level. To understand
the mind more accurately, and to be able to compare different
types of mind, it may be important to know exactly what
computations are being performed in the brain, as set out
previously (Rolls, 2021a).
My answer to the second key question is thus that
explanation of the causes of behavior and mental states at the
mechanistic level of the operation of networks of neurons in
the brain and what they are computing may provide a more
accurate account for the cause of a choice or action than
for example the report given by an individual at the mental
level. Indeed, I argue that the best way of knowing about
the properties of the system, including what it may be like
to be the system, is to know exactly what computations are
being performed in the system, rather than trying to make
inferences about the system from tests such as the Turing test
(Rolls, 2020, 2021a).
THE QUESTION OF DOWNWARD (OR
UPWARD) CAUSATION
It has been argued that downward causation may apply in
some circumstances (Woodward, 2020, 2021a,b), but there is
important discussion about this (Craver and Bechtel, 2007).
Do Environmental Events Cause
Changes in Gene Expression?
An example of possible downward causation that has been
considered is that large scale environmental events may
causally affect gene expression (Woodward, 2021a,b). But let
us consider this further, in the way suggested in my within-
levels of explanation approach to causality. If say an increase
in environmental temperature led to genetic changes, this could
occur in two main ways. One is that random genetic variation
might lead to changes that might increase the size of the
ears, or panting (both good for losing heat), and these might
increase reproductive success for individuals who did not die
from the heat. A second is that the gene expression for certain
genes that for example promoted sweating might be turned
on by their sensitivity (whether direct or indirect) to body
temperature. In both cases, the causal account can be at the
level of mechanistic biology, which provides a complete causal
account of how a change in the environment might affect genes.
Stating that the environment affects the genes in this case may be
thought of as stating that whatever interventionist tests have been
performed do not exclude that there is a relationship between the
environment and the genes, but I argue that we can understand
that there is causality when we analyze the steps involved at the
lower mechanistic level, when the operation of causality becomes
clear. Thus any account of this in terms of “downward causation”
may just be referring to a state in which strong correlations
may be present between levels, but with the causal mechanisms
involved best described at a different level, of how it is at the
biological level that changes in genes can be produced by for
example temperature sensed within the individual.
The Relation Between Neuronal Events
and Mental States
Another example might be that excessive synaptic pruning or
reductions in synaptic transmission produced by lower NMDA
receptor efficacy may causally contribute to some of cognitive
and behavioral symptoms of schizophrenia (Rolls, 2021b). As
these changes in synaptic transmission relate to the symptoms
(which involve the whole person), should this be considered
as a case of across-level causation (Woodward, 2021a,b)? (In
this case, it would be upward causation, from synapses to
cognitive symptoms.) Examples of this type were considered
by Rolls (2021a). The approach I take to such examples of
relations between levels of explanation involving the brain,
behavior, and mind is computational, that mental events can
supervene on brain events, and that implies correlations between
mental events and brain events, but that causality can best be
understood as operating within a level of explanation. In the
present case, the account is that reduced synaptic transmission
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FIGURE 1 | Multiple routes to the initiation of actions and responses to rewarding and punishing stimuli. The inputs from different sensory systems to brain
structures such as the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala allow the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala to evaluate the reward- or punishment-related value of
incoming stimuli, or of remembered stimuli. One type of route is via the language systems of the brain, which allow explicit (verbalizable) decisions involving multistep
syntactic planning to be implemented. The other types of route may be implicit, and include the anterior cingulate cortex for action-outcome, goal-dependent,
learning (Rolls, 2019); and the striatum and rest of the basal ganglia for stimulus-response habits (Rolls, 2014, 2021c). Pallidum / SN—the globus pallidus and
substantia nigra. Outputs for autonomic responses can also be produced using outputs from the orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex (some of which
are routed via the ventral, visceral, part of the anterior insular cortex) and amygdala (Rolls, 2021c). [From Rolls (2021c). Brain Computations: What and How. Oxford
University Press: Oxford.] (9_4d.eps).
(caused for example by high synaptic pruning or reduced NMDA
receptor conductances) reduces the firing rates of populations
of neurons, which destabilizes the attractor neuronal networks
in the prefrontal cortex (Rolls, 2021b,c). Now these prefrontal
cortex attractor networks are involved in maintaining items
in short-term memory, and in holding on-line in short term
memory the top-down bias required to bias processing in some
parts of the brain thus providing a mechanism for top-down
attention (Deco and Rolls, 2005a,b; Luo et al., 2013; Rolls, 2021c).
The computational level of events in the brain thus provides
a causal, computational, account of how these synaptic events
alter behavior so that attention and short-term memory change.
But the causal level is within-level in this approach, at the
level of synapses, transmitters, receptors, and neuronal networks;
and the behavioral changes occur at the same time, but are
descriptions at a higher level of explanation. In such systems
we can describe correlations between levels, or superveniences
between levels of operation of the system, but the mechanistic,
causal, computational account is best dealt with in this case at the
brain level of explanation.
The Relation Between Higher Level Laws
and Lower Level Computations in the
Brain
Another possible case considered as “downward causation”
in physics is when a higher level Law “causes” an effect at
a lower level (Ellis, 2020). Let us take as an example the
interaction between neurons in a population that falls into a
low energy attractor basin (Hopfield, 1982; Amit et al., 1985;
Amit, 1989). This happens to be a system that is highly
relevant to understanding the operation of the cerebral cortex,
as the most characteristic attribute of cerebral cortex is the
highly developed excitatory recurrent collateral local connections
between pyramidal cells that enable local attractor networks to be
implemented for short-term memory, long-term memory, top-
down attention, decision-making etc. (Rolls, 2016, 2021c). If we
have a set of non-linear neurons in a network with excitatory
synapses of strength wij between each pair of neurons i and j and
the firing rate of each neuron is y, and this forms an attractor
network in which the synaptic weights reflect the stored memory
patterns (see Rolls, 2016, 2021c), then the energy of the whole
neuronal population can be expressed (Hopfield, 1982; Treves,






wij(yi− < y >)(yj− < y >) (1)
where < y > is the average firing rate of all the neurons. This
can be understood as follows. If two neurons i and j both have
high firing rates (or in physics the magnetic spins are pointing
in the same direction) and are connected by a strong synaptic
weight, then they will support each other, and this will contribute
to stability. If one neuron i has a high firing rate and j has a low
firing rate and they are connected by a strong synaptic weight,
then each neuron will tend to change the other into its state, and
this will contribute to instability. In the same situation, if the
linking weight is weak, this will make little contribution to the
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stability. The sum of all such interactions will be high when the
system has reached stability as a result of interactions between the
neurons, and this high stability can be expressed as a low energy
E by using a - sign.
The interaction between the neurons (equivalent to spins in a
physics model) can be analyzed at the population level (but not at
the single neuron level) to show how the whole network can fall
into an attractor state, and to show that the number of possible
attractor states, for example the maximum number of different






where CRC is the number of recurrent collateral connections onto
each neuron, k is a scaling factor that depends weakly on the
detailed structure of the rate distribution, on the connectivity
pattern, etc., but is roughly in the order of 0.2-0.3 (Treves,
1991; Treves and Rolls, 1991), and a is the sparseness of the
representation. [For binary neurons with either a high or a zero
firing rate, the sparseness is the proportion of neurons with a high
firing rate (Treves and Rolls, 1991; Rolls, 2021c)]. For example,
for CRC = 12,000 associatively modifiable recurrent collateral
synapses onto each neuron, and a = 0.02, pmax is calculated to
be approximately 36,000.
One concept of causality that has been advanced for systems
with different levels is that because a Law can be specified for
a system such as what is shown in Eqn (2) at a high level (the
population of neurons level), then that Law or rule of operation
formulated at the high level provides “downward causation” to
the lower level, to in this case result in the number of stable
attractor basins being limited to what is shown in Eqn. (2)
(Ellis, 2020).
But that is not how I see the system as operating in terms
of causality. The individual neurons at the lower level do not
wait for a top-down signal from the population level to tell
them what to do next. Instead, it just is a property of the whole
system that the individual neurons at the lower level operate as
neurons each with a certain number of connections to the other
neurons, and the result of the lower level interactions between
the neurons is that only a certain number of stable states can
be stored and correctly retrieved. To elucidate further, when we
simulate such an attractor network in a computer, we set up for
example neurons with threshold linear activation functions, and
modify the synaptic connections between the neurons to store
the memory patterns, and then we let the system run (Rolls,
2012a, 2021c). We find that as we increase the number of memory
patterns stored in the system, at some point, the critical capacity,
the recalled memories become very poor, and the system no
longer works as a memory system (Rolls, 2012a). But we do
not include in the program that we write that the neuron-level
implementation should check up to some higher level to find
out if the number of patterns specified by the Law specifying the
critical capacity has been exceeded, and if so to fall into a random
neuronal firing (or spin) state. Nor is there a high-level part of
the program that knows about Eqn (2) and checks if p is too
high, and if so causes the lower level to fall into a random spin
state (i.e., random set of neurons firing). So the operation of the
system is implemented only at the lower level, and that is where
causality acts, by the firing of individual neurons influencing
other neurons through the modified synaptic weights. Now of
course the operation of the system in terms of its storage capacity
can be explained, and analyzed, at the higher level, where the
interactions between the whole population of neurons can be
understood, and specified as rules or Laws of the operation of the
system. But that does not mean that the higher level rules or Laws
that describe the operation of the whole system have to act down
to the lower level to cause effects there at the low level, whether
synchronously, or after a time delay. Thus I reject the concept
(Ellis, 2020), at least in relation to the operation of the brain, that
Laws that apply at a high level act by “downward causation” to
control the operation of the system at a lower level. The high level
Laws just express some properties of the system.
“Downward Causation,” Confabulation,
and Correlation
An implication of the treatment above of confabulation at an
upper level of the system is rather relevant to the issue of possible
downward causation. We should be wary (due to the possibility
of confabulation), because a claimed example of downward
causation may in fact be incorrect, for in the case of confabulation
the mental thought that is expressed is not in fact in the causal
chain at all of why a behavior or action may have occurred.
Indeed, many examples of what might be claimed to be top-
down causation may be because the concept at the high level is
inadequately defined for it to be really testable as a cause. Take
the example that the position in the status hierarchy might be
considered to be the cause for altered gene expression which
alters serotonin levels. Should we consider this to be a case of
“downward causation,” as suggested (Woodward, 2021b)? This
is likely to reflect a general association or correlation. Position
in a dominance hierarchy is likely to reflect the outcome of
agonistic interactions such as fights, and we know that there
is considerable individual variation in sensitivity of the lateral
orbitofrontal cortex, which decodes this non-reward, to not
winning or losing (Rolls et al., 2020; Xie et al., 2021). Moreover,
the non-reward might lead to active behavior, perhaps initiating
a fight, or to passive behavior, to opt out of trying (Rolls, 2014).
Which of these behaviors is chosen depends on impulsiveness,
which is influenced by similar brain regions (Dalley and Robbins,
2017). And what happens to serotonin system gene expression
is likely to depend causally on the exact chain of processing
and computations, and can be understood at that level. So a
putatively causal statement that “status hierarchy causes gene
expression changes” (Woodward, 2021b) may reflect a general
correlation, but there is no necessary relation, and this is not
a very substantive form of causality. The attempt at a top-
down causal explanation here seems to reflect instead a general
correlation; and the causal factors involved can be described at
the more mechanistic neural level, of the extent to which the
lateral orbitofrontal cortex non-reward neurons are activated in
an individual by losing or not winning (Thorpe et al., 1983;
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O’Doherty et al., 2001; Rolls et al., 2020; Xie et al., 2021), and
by the personality of the individual such as impulsivity and
sensitivity to punishment, which do at the neural systems level
provide an account of the causal links in the chain that lead to
how gene expression might be altered.
What Defines a Level of Operation/
Explanation in the Brain and Mental
Systems? A Computational
Neuroscience Approach
It is useful to provide some guidance on what defines a level of
operation / explanation, at least for what is being considered here,
neural and mental systems. Different levels can be defined by for
example matters of scale and numbers. Some examples follow.
One level is the neuron level. There are very many small ion
channels in a neuron that together with their arrangement on
a neuron influence whether the neuron will generate an action
potential. Each neuron has one output stream of information,
reflected by its action potentials, directed to perhaps 20,000
other neurons. Each neuron has perhaps 20,000 synaptic inputs
from other neurons, which act on the ion channels to influence
whether a neuron produces an action potential. I argue that
this neuron-level is one computational level of operation of the
system, for what the neuron computes is reflected in its single
output stream of information, its action potentials transmitted
to 20,000 other neurons. This is the type of single neuron
computational level of understanding that can be commonly
applied in the mammalian brain (Rolls, 2021c). I include in this
level the fact that it is a property of some ion channels that
the currents that they pass depend on the voltage across the
membrane, as for the n-methyl d-aspartate receptor (NMDAr)
which is important in learning (Rolls, 2021c). I also include in
this level that for the synaptic strengths to modify and be retained
during learning, genes may need to be activated to help produce
the chemicals needed to alter the structure and strength of the
synapse (Kandel, 2001). It is essential to understand the operation
at this level, in terms of the information conveyed by the train
of action potentials from a single neuron, which can be 0.3 bits
in even a short time period of 20–50 ms (Tovee and Rolls, 1995;
Rolls et al., 1997b, 1999), but which is largely independent from
even nearby neurons (up to tens of neurons), as shown by the
evidence that the information rises linearly with the number
of single neurons being recorded (Rolls et al., 1997a; Rolls and
Treves, 2011; Rolls, 2021c).
A higher computational level is that of a population of
neurons. There are very many neurons in a population that
influence how and what the population computes, with one
example being the type of attractor network described above.
In this, as shown in equation 1, coalitions of neurons linked by
strong synapses and high firing rates can be formed and form
a stable basin of attraction, and have the “emergent” property
of completion of the whole memory from any part (Hopfield,
1982; Rolls, 2021c). These networks are typically localized to
a small area of neocortex, to minimize the axonal connection
length between the neurons that must interact in the same
network. Typically there will be 100,000 excitatory neurons
in such a local network, given approximately 10,000 synapses
per neuron devoted to recurrent collateral connections, and a
dilution of connectivity of about 0.1 (Rolls, 2021c). Other types of
network include pattern association networks, and unsupervised
competitive networks to learn new representations (Rolls, 2021c).
In all cases, the computation can be understood at the network
level, and not at the single neuron level (Rolls, 2021c). There is a
characteristic time-scale of operation here too, in the order of 10–
15 ms even for an attractor network, and determined primarily by
the time constant of the excitatory AMPA (α-amino-3-hydroxy-
5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid) receptors that connect the
excitatory neurons (Battaglia and Treves, 1998; Panzeri et al.,
2001; Rolls, 2021c). These dynamics are made fast because the
integrate-and-fire neurons have a low spontaneous firing rate, so
that some neurons are always very close to threshold before the
stimulus is applied, and start exchanging information through
the trained synapses very rapidly. The dynamics of the operation
of the system, while it falls into its attractor state, which is one
of a limited number of possible stable memory states, occurs
continuously in time, and does not require the neurons to ask
the next level up, at which the theory of the number of stable
states can be analyzed (Hopfield, 1982; Treves, 1991; Treves and
Rolls, 1991), whether the current stable state meets the criteria:
the neuronal population just falls into one of its possible stable
states based on interactions between the population of neurons.
The fact that transmitters such as acetylcholine with widespread
effects modulate the excitability of the whole population of
neurons of course influences how stable the states are (Rolls and
Deco, 2015b), but does not raise new issues about causality.
Another level of operation is that involved in solving a
problem such as proving Pythagoras’ theorem, or writing a
paragraph of text. This is a typically serial computational
operation that may require many populations of neurons (of
the type just described) exchanging information with each other
with different steps to the argument, which together may take
seconds or minutes, not the 10–15 ms for a single network to
operate. Another example is the production of speech, which
is a serial operation, and which might be implemented by a
forward trajectory through a state space of different attractor
networks each representing a different part of speech (e.g.,
subject, verb, and object), and each attractor network connected
with stronger forward than backward connections to the next
network (Rolls and Deco, 2015a). Thus the spatial scale here is
different, with many populations of neurons involved; and the
timescale is different, with serial operations being performed.
Due to the almost random spiking times for a given mean firing
rate of individual neurons, the population of neurons under this
stochastic influence, may sometimes jump to a new location in
the high-dimensional space, and this is likely to be important in
creativity (Rolls and Deco, 2010; Rolls et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2018;
Sun et al., 2019; Rolls, 2021c). At this level of explanation, we can
see how sets of networks could implement a multistep algorithm.
At a higher level of explanation, we might specify the
operation at an algorithmic level, for example the computational
steps taken to prove Pythagoras’ theorem, or the steps in the firing
cycle of a combustion engine, or the stages in the life history of a
dragon fly. This is the most useful level for analysis of whether
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the algorithm operates correctly, and to describe the algorithm
to other individuals. And causality can be understood at this
level, as progress with one step of the algorithm can enable the
next step to occur. But the processes can also be understood as
operating at the lower level of sets of neuronal networks in the
brain, which reflect in their connections and operation what has
been learned previously by interaction with the environment, and
so can be constrained by what has been learned to implement
the steps of the algorithm with causality operating at that level
of sets of neuronal populations, with the learned constraints
influencing what is computed without the need for top-down
causality of what can be explained at a higher level to cause
things to change, after a small delay, at the lower level of sets of
populations of neurons.
At a higher level of explanation and operation of the
system, it might be that when the neuronal networks are
performing a particular type of computation, perhaps monitoring
a multi-step chain of reasoning using higher order syntactic
thoughts grounded in the world, that it is a property of such
a system that it feels like something to be having those higher
order thoughts about oneself that are grounded in the world.
That is the computational processor that I suggest becomes
engaged when we report phenomenal consciousness. Part of the
argument is that much global processing can take place without
phenomenal consciousness, for example riding a bicycle for a
time while thinking about something else (such as a theory of
consciousness), so that a special type of computation appears to
be involved when we have phenomenal feelings of consciousness
(Rolls, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2020).
So scale and number seem often to be useful in describing
levels. They provide an independent way of defining a level to
ideas of for example whether any one scale (or several scales) is
complete (Ellis, 2020). For me, no one scale or level of explanation
or operation suffices for a complete explanation, in that although
causality operates within a level, understanding of how the
system operates at different levels of operation may be useful.
For example, understanding at the neuronal / pharmacological
level may be useful for treatment, whereas understanding at
the level of reasoning may be useful to understand Pythagoras’
theorem. I consider that the whole world is a set of different levels
of both operation and explanation, and they are linked by the
ideas of supervenience and subvenience, or better convenience
(see below), which are non-causal but different properties of
the operation of the same system, understood and analyzed
at different levels, with causality operating within each level,
and not between levels. A consequence of my approach is that
causality can be described as operating simultaneously as each of
several levels of operation or explanation, but this does not imply
multiple causes: the operations at each level provide different
ways of describing and analyzing the computational properties
of what is a single system.
Summary
My response to the third key issue, possible cases of “downward
causation” (from a higher level to a lower level), is that they can
be accounted for, at least for mental vs brain levels of operation
and explanation, by the approach to causality described here, in
FIGURE 2 | Schematic representation of the relation between physical brain
states (P1 and P2) and mental states (M1 and M2). Undirected edges indicate
supervenience / subvenience relations which apply upward and downward
and are non-causal. The edges with an arrow indicate a causal relation
(supervenience.eps).
which causality operates within but not between levels. Moreover,
the neural level is more substantive, for it enables the links in the
causal chains that might lead to different effects to be followed
across time, whereas events expressed in words at a higher mental
level may be too imprecise to reflect more than correlations; and
further, may reflect confabulation.
IMPLICATIONS FOR DUALISM AND
PHYSICAL REDUCTIONISM
Descartes took a dualist approach to the relation between the
mind and the brain (Descartes, 1644), and that raised the problem
of how the mind and brain relate to each other, which has been a
problem in the philosophy of mind ever since. One solution has
been to propose a reductive physicalism, in which it is argued that
mental events can be reduced to brain events, with no differences
in kind (see Kim, 2011; Carruthers, 2019).
The approach that I have proposed is that the mental
events [including phenomenal consciousness (Rolls, 2020)] can
be different in kind from brain events, and that the mental
events supervene computationally on brain events. How the
computational levels relate to each other has been described with
examples by Rolls (2020, 2021a). My approach proposes that
there is a necessary relation between a lower level and an upper
level of explanation / operation, with events at the neural level
always (i.e., necessarily) being related to some mental event at
the higher level; and vice versa. The correlation between the
appropriate events at the neural level and at the mental level will
be high. But this relation between the lower level and the higher
level is not causal, because the events at the lower (neural) and
higher (mental) level happen at the same time (Figure 2). Some
philosophers use the term “supervenience” for how the high level
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relates to the lower level. However, the term “supervenience” may
carry with it some implications for some philosophers. In this
context, another term that I suggest for this is “convenience,”
which from the Latin means “coming together” (con-veniens).
This term, “convenience,” has the advantage that it could be
applied to both supervenience and subvenience, and does not
carry with it the implications of the term “supervenience” as it
may be understood by some philosophers. My proposal is that
in at least a computational system such as the brain, the higher
level, for example mental, events are what are implemented by the
lower level, neural, events, but that this is not a causal relationship
because the events at the different levels happen at the same time,
and is a “convenient” relationship. This computational approach
to the relation between mental and brain events may offer a
solution to the problems of dualism and of reductive physicalism,
with the relations summarized in Figure 2.
Given this computational approach to the relation between
the brain and the mind, the events at the mental level can be
different in kind at the mental level from the neural level. The
mental events might include having thoughts about one’s own
syntactic thoughts, in order to correct one’s lower order multi-
step planning and reasoning. If the reasoning and planning
is grounded in the world, if it is for example about rewards
and punishers that might have implications for life or death
of the individual who can think ahead about its own future,
then I suggest that one of the properties of the system may
be phenomenal consciousness (Rolls, 2004, 2007a,b, 2008, 2011,
2012b, 2020). The thoughts at that mental level are an example
of what I mean by differences in kind from a lower level
of explanation, which in this case might be the level of the
operation of neurons in the brain, or of populations of neurons
to implement a particular computation. All of those firings and
the closely related network operations (Rolls, 2021c) are different
I suggest in kind from mental events including that we feel
conscious (Rolls, 2020).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In order to understand the relation between the mind and the
brain, and whether mental events cause brain events, or vice
versa, it is important to have a theory of causality that is useful in
computational neuroscience. Here I have proposed an approach
to causality at least within computational neuroscience that goes
beyond interventionist tests to include also temporal order, and
that the causality should operate within levels of operation or
explanation, and not between levels.
Second, I have shown that although different levels of
explanation for the operation of the system may be useful for
different purposes, some levels of explanation may be more
accurate than others. In particular, I propose that the mechanistic
neural level may be more accurate and reliable than the mental
level provided by verbal report of the causes for actions, because
for example of confabulation which can occur given that the brain
contains multiple routes to produce behavior. It is in principle
possible to know which of the multiple routes to action illustrated
in Figure 1 was engaged for some behavior or decision, by
measuring which system in the brain is active on a particular
occasion (McClure et al., 2004; Rolls, 2021c).
Further, I propose that the best way of knowing about the
properties of the system, including what it may be like to be
the system, is to know exactly what computations are being
performed in the system, rather than trying to make inferences
about the system from tests such as the Turing test. Third, I argue
that the possible cases of “downward causation” (from a higher
level to a lower level) that are discussed in the literature can be
accounted for by the approach to causality described here, in
which causality operates within but not between levels.
Overall, these proposals offer a computational neuroscience-
based approach to the problems raised by both dualism
and reductive physicalism; and an approach to understanding
causality in computational systems.
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